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 Abstract:  
 Each affective state has distinct motor-expressions, sensory perceptions, 
autonomic, and cognitive patterns. Panksepp (1998) proposed seven neural 
affective systems of which the SEEKING system, a generalized approach-seeking 
system, motivates organisms to pursue resources needed for survival. When an 
organism is presented with a novel stimulus, the dopamine (DA) in the nucleus 
accumbens septi (NAS) is released. The DA circuit outlines the generalized 
mesolimbic dopamine-centered SEEKING system and is especially responsive 
when there is an element of unpredictability in forthcoming rewards. We propose 
that when the outcome of this interaction is unexpected or unanticipated then 
Panksepp’s “cognitive or expectancy reset” mechanism involving the cognitive 
dissonance would yield the subjective emotion of surprise. In order to 
appropriately react to the environment’s stimuli one needs fundamental processes 
that would enable one to distinguish between what is novel and what has been 
already experienced, as well as the different degrees of novelty. Novel events are 
those whose essential features of the representation (visceral and perceptual) are 
altered and being discrepant provoke more sustained attention. Novelty arises 
from salient and arousing events and the organism experiences surprise, as 
coming out of a habitual state. In this framework, we shall look at established 
theories of emotions and propose a different approach to their taxonomy. 
 
 Keywords: habituation, change, novelty, arousal, taxonomy of affective 
processes, SEEKING system. 
 
 Imagine a life in which incoherent plans are made and discarded 
immediately, in which there is no appropriate evaluation of the happening in 
significant events, a life without motivation and meaning. In such a life the 
element that colors, puts value on our actions, bestows upon us a unique 
personality and manipulates our interaction with the physical and social 
environment, is absent. This fascinating element, intriguingly difficult to 
analyze, is none other than the emotion.  
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 I. Flashback 
 1.1 Philosophical approach to affective states 
Discussions related to emotions flooded philosophical speculations of the 
ancient, medieval and renaissance time and, to them, in the 17th and 18th century, 
the modern mind added new concepts. To the psychologists’ “ordinary” 
emotions, theologians, of the Judeo-Christian tradition, likewise, supplied their 
“religious emotion-types”, i.e. gratitude, contrition, love of God, piety, 
compassion, etc. The terminology expressing emotions changed with the change 
of the approach and that of time. Thus, Aristotle’s pathos (i. e. pathos), 
important in moral life, changed for the Roman Stoics into “emotion”, as they 
adopted Cicero’s translation of the Greek pathos into the Latin perturbatio (i.e. 
disturbance) and afterwards it turned out to be affectus (i.e. affect) for Seneca. 
Stoics connected emotions to cognition and, throughout several centuries, 
debated with the Epicureans on the place of emotions for a good life. Others 
preferred passio (i.e. passion), connecting emotions with “suffering” and 
“endurance”. Galen, the Greek physician and philosopher, pursued Plato’s 
tripartite model of the human mind, i.e. the reasoning, the desiring, and the 
emotive parts, and offered a biological and physiological basis of each one. His 
theory of the body’s humors intended to explain a person’s dispositions and 
temperament, i.e. sanguine, phlegmatic, choleric, and melancholic. Descartes 
described emotion as “passion” and meant by that “the perceptions, feelings or 
emotions of the soul which we relate specifically to it, and which are caused, 
maintained and fortified by some movement of the [animal] spirits”1. There are, 
in his opinion, six primitive “passions”, i.e. wonder, love, hatred, desire, joy and 
sadness, and these could be the ingredients used for a good life. Spinoza’s 
emotions, the affections of the soul, are yielded by one reality, encompassing 
mind and body, and are responsible for making the difference on the quality of 
life by motivating one to act or restrain. Hume challenged the inferior place of 
passion in philosophy and disputed the role of reason. For him, emotions were 
the very essence of human social and moral life. Hobbes called them also 
“passions” and assimilated them to appetites and aversions whereas Kant 
considered them as conative phenomena. Twentieth century Anglo-American 
philosophy and psychology included emotions in cognitive processes as well and 
for that behaviorism was one strong reason. 
 
                                                 
1
 Cited in Solomon, R. C., Lewis, M., Haviland-Jones, J.M., and Barrett, L. F., (eds.) “Philosophy 
of Emotions”, Handbook of Emotions, New York: Guilford Press, 3rd. ed., 2008. 
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 1.2 Interdisciplinary approach to affective states 
Despite its lengthy history in human thought, the nature of emotion is still 
elusive. For many centuries, the approach to emotion studies have been 
exclusively pursued by philosophers and psychologists, currently, however, 
emotion is a topic of different branches of interdisciplinary research. This 
widening of interest seems now reasonable given that emotions arise, as Oatley 
(1999) noticed, with the meeting of two worlds: nature and culture. Scherer, 
Wallbott, & Summerfield (1986) emphasized that emotional experiences happen 
in social interactions, hence the analyzing of “pure” emotional expressions in a 
nonsocial setting, such as a laboratory, might be questioned. Adolphs (2001) 
claim that “the subject matter of emotion is the relation between organism and 
environment, the effect that interaction of the two has on organism’s survival 
and well-being. Emotions thus pertain to the value that stimuli and situation have 
for the organism”.  
 What elicits an emotional experience? There are several theories 
concerning this. Watson (1919) proposed that events themselves induce 
emotions, as in stimulus-response theories. Cannon (1929/2003) argued that 
psychological processes, patterns of neural activity of the brain, are the causes, 
while James (1894) believed that they are evoked by the peripheral autonomic 
activity. Tomkins (1962) considered that facial and other expressions induce 
emotions, whereas James (1980) thought that behaviors such as attack and flight 
stimulate them. Motivational processes, such as hunger, were seen by Tomkins 
to bring about emotions, although Parkinson (1997) regarded the desire to 
intimidate an opponent as motivational and thus the cause of emotional 
reactions. Appraisal theory (Roseman, 1984; Frijda, 1986; Oatley & Johnson-
Laird, 1987; Scherer, 1992; Smith & Lazarus, 1991; Stein & Levine, 1987) 
claims that emotions are reactions to evaluation (appraisals) of events and 
situations.  
 In psychological discussions, emotions are generally set apart from 
cognition and conation as well as reflexes. However, most contemporary authors 
agree that emotions’ behavioral schemata are to be distinguished from other 
conceptual areas based on their duration, complexity and their adaptive value. 
Accordingly, on basis of their duration, emotions could be seen as short and long 
lasting, referring thus to reflex reactions and affects or personality traits, 
respectively. From the point view of their complexity, on the one hand, they are 
regarded as very simple, primitive and hard-wired behavioral patterns, as in the 
case of reflex responses and some basic survival related appetitive behaviors. On 
the other hand, they are considered more complex and learned cognitive 
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activities. From the perspective of their adaptive value, emotions are considered 
as phylogenetically advanced adaptive response patterns, based on the integrated 
activity of several components and providing high survival value (Gainotti, 
2001). 
 The emotional system can also be conceived as a set of responsive 
dispositions, where each one would indicate a particular relation with the 
environment. First, there are affect dispositions, producing feelings of pleasure 
and pain and corresponding functional attuning. (Cacioppo, Gardner & Bentson, 
1997; Russell & Barrett, 1999; Rolls, 1999) Second, there are provisions for 
global motivational variations in tonic activity, effort and alertness (Pribram & 
McGuinness, 1975), inhibition (Gray, 1990), as well as the attentional arousal 
mechanisms, and the autonomic arousal (Bradley & Lang, 1994). Third, there 
are specific motivational dispositions that, when activated, produce major 
variations in action readiness – dispositions for motivation like “seeking” or 
desire, self-protection, confrontation, play, or submission (Panksepp, 1998). 
Their activation corresponds to different “basic emotions”. Fourth, there are 
dispositions for various individual autonomic reactions – for motor responses 
such as facial expressions, voice intonation, postures (Frijda, 2001).  
The discrete states and variables of emotions are difficult to analyze in 
laboratory, thus, for long, unobservable emotional processes have been 
approached through the examination of facial expressions on which the 
universality of ‘basic emotions’ is mostly based. Darwin (1965) was very 
interested in studying emotions, and analyzed them from an evolutionary 
perspective. Approaching people of different cultures, he determined that there is 
a set of universal, “basic emotions”, each of which is distinctive in its adaptive 
implication and psychological expression. Before Darwin, as he mentions in his 
Expression of Emotions in Man and Animals (1872/1998), the facial expression 
of emotions had been studied by the painter Le Brun who published his 
“Conferences” in 1667. “Anatomy and Philosophy of Expression” was published 
by the physiologist Sir Charles Bell in 1806. In 1862, G. B. Duchenne published 
his “Mecanisme de la Physionomie Humaine”, in which he analyzed the 
movements of facial muscles. He permitted Darwin to copy from his works the 
photographs he needed to use. Darwin thought that emotions and the way we 
express them are products of our animal ancestry. He saw the “basic emotions” 
to be biological in nature. Bowler (2005) argues that Darwin’s need to minimize 
the gap between humans and animals, to convince his readers of his evolutionary 
theory brought him to the study of facial expressions.  
 Darwin’s book begins and ends stressing on three principles, which rule 
the ways animals and humans express their emotions. First, there is the principle 
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of serviceable associated habits that links some modes of expression to adaptive 
behavior, as when fear is expressed by bodily changes designed to prepare for 
fight. Second, there is the principle of antithesis emphasizing that emotion can 
be expressed by behavior, which is exact opposite of that elicited automatically 
by the opposite behavior. A dog exhibits affection for its owner through a 
behavior that differs from the one in case of fear and anger. Third, a principle 
that links expression to direct action of the nervous system, as when fear elicits 
trembling. Throughout his book, Darwin never used the expression “basic 
emotions”, instead he begins the second chapter by mentioning “special 
expression of man ... [which are] innate or universal, and which alone deserve to 
rank as true expressions”. His evidence for them universality comes out of 
answers he received to 16 questions. The answers were collected by Englishmen 
living or traveling in Africa, America, Australia, Borneo, China, India, Malaysia 
and New Zealand. 
 Tomkins (1962), taking up Darwin’s work after a century of neglect, listed 
a series of emotions associated with their respective facial expressions. He 
considered these expressions to be inherited and under the control of subcortical 
centers in the brain. 
 Several years later, Ekman (1973) used Darwin’s method of showing six 
photographs expressing emotions and asking different people, from 21 countries, 
to judge the emotions shown. Ekman studying the autonomic changes associated 
with six “basic emotions” (happiness, sadness, fear, anger, disgust, and surprise) 
found that each one of them was associated with specific bodily patterns. Ekman 
(1994), influenced by Darwin (1872/1997) and Tomkins (1962), classified the 
characteristics of basic emotions, which distinguish them from one another and 
other affective phenomena.  
Panksepp (1998:33) summarized four possible ways of viewing the role of 
affective consciousness in the generation of adaptive behaviours in emotional 
situations: (I) the “commonsense” view that emotions cause bodily responses; 
(II) the possibility that the emotions and bodily responses are independently but 
concurrently organized; (III) the counterintuitive James-Lange type of view that 
emotions arise by the way we bodily respond in emotional situations; and (IV) a 
more realistic view, which suggests that all levels of information processing in 
the generation of emotional responses interact with each other.  
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 Figure 1. Four possible ways of viewing the role of affective consciousness in generation of 
adaptive behaviours in emotional situations (from Panksepp, 1998: 33). 
 
1.3 Debates on Emotions 
1.3.1. Primacy debate: appraisal vs. arousal  
 Zajonc (1980) claimed that simple familiarity with something creates 
affective reactions, such as liking or disliking, for that item. Objects were 
presented subliminally while participants were engaged in another task. The 
results revealed that though the participants showed no recognition of the 
subliminal items, they gave them higher preference ratings than novel items. 
Zajonc argued that the form of experience that we call feeling accompanies all 
cognitions, preceding them and lacking awareness, and concluded that cognition 
is not necessary in order to have affective experiences. 
 Lazarus (1984) argued that cognitive appraisal underlies and is an integral 
feature of all emotional states. LeDoux (1989, 1995) has shown that emotions, 
especially fear, are recognized by the brain’s two routes, subcortical and cortical, 
suggesting that Zajonc’s hypothesis of direct elicitation of emotion without the 
need of cognition might be right.  
 
 1.3.2. Whether or not “basic” 
 What is the need of such a distinction? An understanding of certain 
affective processes as basic would nevertheless create another category, i.e. that 
of non-basic emotions. Alternatively, there could be another case and that would 
probably lead to affective states as neither basic nor non-basic, an instigator state 
that might be by itself the cause of such states. Why do we need at all to make 
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divisions between innumerable affective processes one experiences throughout 
life, nay, within couple of hours?  
 We have already stated that the distinction among affective states is 
presumed to have started with Darwin’s eagerness to connect human primates 
with their non-human evolutionarily related species. Darwin (1872/1998) 
considered that emotions could well fill up the explanatory gap between animals 
and our humanoid ancestors. “He who admits on general ground that the 
structure and habits of all animals have been gradually evolved, will look at the 
whole subject of Expressions in a new and interesting light”. In his opinion, 
there are six “special expression of man ... [which are] innate or universal and 
which alone deserve to rank as true expressions”. 
 Tomkins (1962/2008), following Darwin identified emotions associating 
them with corresponding facial expressions and connected these emotions with 
subcortical centres in the brain. Tomkins identified eight primary motivating 
mechanisms, the “inborn protocols that when triggered encourage us to spring 
into action”2. He divided them into “positive” and “negative” affects 
respectively, and a “very brief neutral reset button” that is associated with the 
emotion of surprise. (Table 2)  
 
Positive 
 
Interest-excitement  eyebrows down, tracking behavior, attitude of 
looking and listening 
 
Enjoyment-joy  smile, lips widened and out, slow and deep breathing 
Resetting 
 
Surprise-startle  eyebrows up, eyes blink 
Negative 
 
Distress-anguish  crying, arched eyebrow, corners of the mouth turned 
down, tears and rhythmic sobbing  
 
Contempt-disgust  sneer, upper lip lifted 
 
Anger-rage  frown, jaw clenched, face red 
 
Fear-terror  eyes frozen open; pale, cold, sweaty; facial trembling 
with hair erect 
 
Shame-humiliation  eyes cast down, head down 
 
Table 2 Tomkins’ classification of affects 
 
 Ekman (1994), influenced by Darwin (1872/1997) and his mentor Tomkins 
(1962/2008), classified the characteristics of basic emotions, which distinguish 
                                                 
2
 Tomkins, (2008) p. xiii. 
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them from one another and other affective phenomena as follows: (1) Distinctive 
universal signals (facial expression); (2) Presence in other primates; (3) 
Distinctive physiology (such as a specific ANS reaction for each emotion); (4) 
Distinctive universal antecedents – there are certain stimuli, preprogrammed 
evolutionarily, that will elicit each of these basic emotions. This does not deny 
the importance of learning in emotional responsiveness since learning 
contributes to the establishment of a connection between a stimulus and an 
emotion; (5) Coherence of response system (i.e. coherence between a given 
emotion, its facial expression, an ANS pattern and CNS activity; (6) Quick onset 
– emotions can begin within milliseconds of the presentation of an emotionally 
provoking stimulus; (7) Brief duration – usually in seconds rather than minutes 
or hours. This distinguishes emotions from moods; (8) Automatic appraisal 
mechanism; (9) Unbidden occurrence – emotional responses occur automatically 
to a given stimulus; they happen to us, they are not chosen by us; (10) 
Distinctive subjective experience; and (11) Distinctive thoughts, memories 
images. 
 Bechara, Damasio & Damasio (2000), asserted that the brain structures 
associated with the emotional states have all been independently associated with 
bodily responses. He also refers to drives and motivations, pain and pleasure as 
triggers or constituents of emotions but not as emotions in the proper sense. The 
same distinction is made by Panksepp (1998) between proper emotions and 
drives who does not consider hunger, thirst, and disgust to be emotions. From an 
evolutionary point of view, “basic emotions” are “rapid acting, failsafe devices 
that produce behavioral, physiological and cognitive responses tailored to certain 
critical features of the environment.” (Griffiths, 1997:240)  
 Emotions of happiness, sadness, surprise, disgust, anger, and fear, have 
been claimed to be universal in respect of human population. (Ekman, 1994; 
Izard, 1995) Ellsworth (1991) argues that these expressions have been theorists’ 
major “evidence” for holistic emotion programs that could not be broken down 
into smaller units. Even though universal prototypical patterns have been found 
for these “basic emotions”, there is no evidence that the facial expressions are 
the indicators of emotions in spontaneous interactions. There are several 
problems in linking facial expressions with emotion-antecedent appraisal. The 
main problem is that there is no known mechanism of linking them. Besides, the 
dynamically changing emotional expressions are not easily linked to a static 
verbal label. In addition, the implicit and explicit social norms impose a 
powerful role of regulation and expression control that renders the study of such 
expressions rather difficult. Moreover, facial expressions are not necessarily an 
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indicator of emotional experience since they can serve several different 
functions. (Kaiser & Wehrle, 2001)  
 ‘Basic emotions’ are considered as having evolved for their adaptive value 
in dealing with fundamental life tasks. Among these tasks, Lazarus (1991) 
mentions facing danger, processing towards attaining goals, experiencing 
irrevocable loss, “common adaptation tasks as these are appraised and 
configured into core relational themes”. Stein & Trabasso (1992) consider that 
the main task is the attainment of a goal. Attaining it, happiness is the result; 
failure induces sadness; anger results by loosing it, while expectation of failure 
leads to fear. For Tooby & Cosmides (1990) the appraisal of a current event is 
influenced by our past experiences and are adaptive situations that recurred 
innumerable times in our evolutionary history. 
 Ortony & Turner (1990), Scherer (1992) and Kaiser and Scherer (1998) 
criticized the concept of “basic emotions” as fixed biological programs. They 
argue that there are classes of appraisals independent of “basic emotions”. In 
connection with this, Scherer (1984) suggests that there are a large number of 
highly differentiated emotional states, which are not exhausted by assuming the 
“basic emotions”. Facial expressions are not seen as “readout” of motor 
programs but rather as indicators of mental states and evaluation processes. 
Smith and Scott (1997) and Roseman (1984) argue that the link between the 
facial and appraisal dimension is based on the relation between facial expression 
and basic emotion. Unlike Ekman, they claim that single components of facial 
patterns do have a meaning and this meaning can be explained as manifestations 
of specific appraisal outcomes. 
 In spite of the disagreement, authors do agree that raising the eyebrows and 
raising the eyelids are associated with appraisal dimensions related to attentional 
activity, novelty, and unexpectedness. Moreover, there is consensus that 
corrugator activity (frown) encodes not only unpleasantness but more 
specifically perceived goal obstacles and the presence of goal discrepancies. 
(Kaiser & Wehrle, 2001)  
 
 1.4. A dichotomist approach to emotional experiences  
The dichotomy of mind and body too influenced the attempt of theorizing 
emotions. When the “mind” led, the emotions have been approached through 
appraisal processes, through perception, attention and evaluation. Several models 
have been proposed to explain how we appraise events as well as the links from 
a particular event to specific emotions (Lazarus, 1991; Smith & Lazarus, 1991; 
Ortony, Clore, and Collins, 1988; Roseman, 1984; Scherer, 1984; Smith and 
Ellsworth, 1985). In their models, the emotions were triggered by the meaning 
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attributed by the subject to the encountered event. When the embodied and 
situated nature of cognition is considered, arousal, behavior and facial 
expressions become indicators of emotional experiences as well. Prinz (2004) 
situates the dichotomy in a single place by arguing that emotions are embodied 
appraisals, bodily states that track meaning in the environment. Fear, for 
instance, is the embodied evaluation that some aspect in the environment is 
dangerous.  
Is there an irreducibly specific element for a particular “basic” emotion? 
Are there definite properties, such as level of arousal, intensity, positive or 
negative reactions, self-or-other-directedness, specifying the peculiarity of each 
of them? Experiences might be individuated according to their content and 
character, by the instantiation of phenomenal properties, by appealing to 
counterfactuals3, by appealing to neural events or by appeal to some properties 
that must coexist during the same experience4.  
Since 1884 when William James published the article “What is an 
Emotion?”, several theories have been proposed, siding either the body or the 
mind, i.e. either arousal or appraisal processes.  
 
 1.4.1 James-Lange Theory 
William James (1884) published the first widely accepted theory, known as 
the James-Lange theory (the same theory was devised independently by James 
and Lange). James argued that the body reacts to certain situations (like danger) 
with bodily responses (increase breathing, heart rate etc).  
 According to James, different emotions are the result of our body reacting 
in different ways, so our emotions are just our perception of a bodily response. 
In this respect, “fear feels different from anger or love because it has a different 
physiological signature”. (LeDoux, 1998:44)  
 
 
 
 
Figure 2 James-Lange theory of emotion 
 
Crucially, in this theory each emotion is linked to a unique physiological 
response. So fear feels different to love because our body responds uniquely in 
fear-inducing and love-inducing situations. 
                                                 
3
 “If I could have the same experience of surprise without the fear, then they are separated 
experiences”. 
4
 The pitch cannot be perceived without volume. 
Response 
“I run” 
Stimulus 
“I see a bear” 
Feeling 
“I feel fear” 
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 1.4.2 Cannon-Bard Theory 
Walter Cannon (1929) was a physiologist studying “emergency reactions” 
like fear, hunger, and pain. He noted that the autonomic nervous system (ANS) 
was activated in many emotions in a uniform way. He thought this must be in 
anticipation of action, rather than as a reaction to it and therefore the James-
Lange theory could not be correct. In addition, we often feel the emotion before 
the ANS kicks in, suggesting James must be wrong. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
We also know that certain physiological states can affect more than one 
response. For example, Dutton and Aron (1974) asked men to tell a story to an 
attractive woman whilst either standing on a safe or unsafe bridge. Stories from 
the unsafe bridge had a higher sexual content, due to arousal from danger 
causing more sexual thought. This is an example of a singular bodily response 
(response to danger) influencing a non-danger related feeling, suggesting again 
the James-Lange theory of specific bodily responses linked to specific feelings 
needs to be modified. 
 
 1.4.3 Appraisal Theories 
Appraisal is now considered a central process in emotion theories. Only 
recently, the conscious and unconscious pathways to emotion have been 
investigated.  
Arnold (1960) was concerned with the missing piece of the puzzle “What 
causes the reaction in the first place?” For Arnold, their must be some sort of 
appraisal process which allows us to analyze a situation which then produces an 
action tendency (bear   run), the feeling of which is the outcome of this 
process (Figure 4). 
For example, anger is often aroused in response to feeling offended by 
someone’s words or actions. However, offence requires an evaluation of the 
situation and can involve a wide-range of cultural norms and values. In the Inuit 
culture, displays of anger are rarely seen (Briggs, 1970), suggesting that 
appraisal may be quite different across social groups (or even individual people). 
According to appraisal theorists like Arnold (see also Lazarus, 1991) this is 
unconscious as it happens, but we should be able to reflect back on the appraisal 
process afterwards to examine what happened. In order for a stimulus to produce 
Feeling 
“I feel fear” 
 
Stimulus 
“I see a bear” 
Response 
“I run” 
Figure 3. Cannon-Bard theory of emotion 
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an affective response, the brain has to appraise its significance. Action 
tendencies are consequences of these appraisals.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
Phillips et al. (2003) have reviewed the emotion literature taking into 
account a substantial amount of neurobiological research and have argued for a 
model of emotion, which includes a regulatory stage. They argue that three main 
components are important for emotion perception: (1) Appraisal and 
identification of the emotional significance of a stimulus; (2) Production of a 
specific affective state in response, including autonomic, neuroendocrine and 
somatomotor (facial, gestural, vocal, behavioural) responses and conscious 
emotional feeling; and (3) Regulation, so the emotional experience, expression 
or subsequent actions can be modified to be contextually appropriate if 
necessary. 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
This theory suggests that a stimulus that is identified as emotive and 
produces affective states may be dependent upon the activity of two neural 
systems: (1) the ventral system (including the amygdala, insula, ventral striatum, 
and ventral regions of the anterior cingulate gyrus and prefrontal cortex) 
important for the identification of emotional significance of the stimuli; and (2) 
the dorsal system (including the hippocampus and dorsal regions of the anterior 
cyngulate gyrus  and prefrontal cortex) where cognitive processes are integrated 
with emotional input, important for the performance of executive functions 
(including attention, planning). Thus, the ventral system is seen as important for 
the rapid appraisal of emotional content and autonomic response regulation, 
while the dorsal system is important for the effortful regulation of the resulting 
affective states. 
Appraisal Stimulus Action 
Tendency 
Feeling 
Figure 4. Arnold (1960) theory of emotion 
 
+ / - regulation 
Appraisal 
 
Stimulus 
 
Affective state / 
behaviour 
 
Regulation 
 
Figure 5. Phillips et al. (2003) model of emotion 
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1.4.4 The Schachter-Singer Cognitive Arousal Theory 
 Schachter and Singer (1962) started with the assumption that physiological 
responses in emotion inform our brain that a state of heightened arousal exists. 
They induced artificial physiological arousal by injecting the subjects with 
adrenaline that activated the ANS. Their research concluded that once the bodily 
arousal was detected the cognitive processes take over by asserting the situation 
and label the arousal accordingly. This labeling of the arousal is what determines 
the emotions we feel.  
 
 
 
 
       
 II. Reshuffling Emotions 
 2. 1 The mind-body problem and the affective processes 
 The classic mind-body dichotomy increased in its complexity by adding to 
it another problem, the mind-brain interaction and their possible/impossible 
interaction. It is not the purpose of this paper to compare the basic workings of 
the mind/brain or those of the mind un/related to the brain. Many researchers 
claim that the brain would not necessarily tell us anything about the workings of 
the mind, that science cannot study the mind. Others, on the other hand, 
admitting that the mind of each one of us is different, still there are certain 
properties of the mind common to us all. Frith (2007) does not see how brain 
studies could be conducted while completely ignoring the mind. Everything we 
know about the world around us, he points out, comes to us through the brain’s 
connection with the physical world. Knowing where the brain has been damaged 
enables us to predict the content of the person’s mind, even though there could 
be changes in the brain that would not necessarily show changes in the mind. 
Frith claims that there could not be changes in the mind (mental activity) without 
there also being changes in the brain, because “whatever happens in my mind is 
caused by, or at least depends upon, brain activity”. 
However, leaving aside this debate, we shall return to affective processes 
through which the mind (mental activity, subjective experiences included) seems 
to connect to the brain and the physiological processes of the body. We shall 
analyze affective states generated by certain external stimuli that are causing 
mental phenomena, ascribed to specific areas of the brain, that further produce 
particular behaviour.  
At any step, the world offers us change and uncertainty that require 
constant adaptation and learning. Stability is safe; the unexpected is not always 
Arousal Stimulus Cognition Feeling 
Figure 6. Schachter and Singer model of emotion 
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welcome. In order to operate functionally at its latent potentiality, the organism 
needs certain stability. The salient world, constantly encountered, has a threshold 
beyond which it becomes disturbing, even though this threshold varies in 
different organisms. Feedback, homeostasis, autonomic and regulatory processes 
strive to reduce distortion, adjusting the organism to its optimal functionality. 
Scientific work in social and natural sciences, based on the supposition that 
unknowability of situations originates in lack of information, led to ever-
increasing information seeking and processing. Their central goal has been 
avoidance of surprises. Unpredictability and surprise are fundamental aspects of 
the surrounding world and led researchers to the study of stability in chaotic 
dynamics of the complex systems. 
 No matter how fond we seem to be for changes in general, for the 
excitement of not knowing and the delight of uncertainty, stability, tacitly and 
continuously, is imposed on us by diverse internal processes. The organism lives 
its life effectively through various processes taking place between different 
subsystems of an organism enabling it thereby to deal effectively with the 
environment. As Arp (2008:13) argues, “this proper functioning, that yields 
internal homeostasis, takes place at levels in the hierarchy of the organism 
ranging from the coordinated activities in the cell, to cell performing coordinated 
processes in an organ, to organs performing coordinated processes in a 
subsystem, to subsystems performing coordinated activities in an organism”. 
These somewhat steady maintenance processes make us what we are, 
delimitating us from other species: “rats have a richer olfactory life, eagles have 
keener eyes and dolphins may have thoughts that we barely fathom”5. At the 
same time, the moment the environment significantly changes, they 
automatically respond to the situation by preparing the organism to optimally 
deal with it and compensate for the change. 
 If this imposed stability is so important for the proper functioning of the 
organism, how does it cope with the salient surrounding? Why does it need 
stability? How important is it for the organism to live and function in a stable 
and safe environment? 
 Is there any genetic and physiologic need for stability? In a gene pool, the 
good genes aim at stability that would facilitate building efficient survival 
machine-bodies. Dawkins (1989: 86), taking into account Maynard Smith’s 
Evolutionary Stable Strategy (ESS), defines this strategy as “a gene pool that 
cannot be invaded by any new gene”. The erratic mutations or immigration of 
new genes would be thus “penalized by natural selection”, in trying to keep the 
                                                 
5
 Panksepp (1998), p. 4. 
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ESS safe. If, at times, a new gene succeeds to invade the gene pool, there is a 
transitional period of instability, before a new evolutionary stable set becomes 
stable.  
 Seeing stability from a cultural perspective, Distin (2005) takes up 
Dawkins’ idea of “memes”, cultural replicators, and speaks about the 
evolutionary stable sets of memes. The genes, after providing theirs survival 
machines with brains capable of imitation, would have to compete for brain’s 
limited capacity of paying attention in order to dominate over other memes. The 
success depends on the stability of the meme and its “penetrance in the cultural 
environment”. Transmission of culture therefore depends on the development of 
cultural replicators, and for that to happen, stability is needed. At the same time, 
Distin (2005: 122) suggests that memetic replication is preceded by the 
emergence of stable behavioral patterns. It seems therefore reasonable to assume 
that in a stable gene pool there would be an evolutionary stable strategy 
consisting of stable behavioral patterns that would imprint on its members 
evolutionary stable sets of memes. 
 From another perspective, genetic instability, the hallmark of human 
cancer, is responsible for cellular changes that confer progressive transformation 
on cancerous cells. Huang et al (2006) proposed that tumor development is a 
result of expansion and progression on genetic alterations through the induction 
of genetic instability. Genetically unstable phenotype might increase mutation 
rate (Loeb, 1991) hence genetic instability might be necessary for cancer to 
develop. 
 Stability plays an important role in evolutionary theories and social 
theories of human societies. In human societies, reciprocal altruism is a 
ubiquitous, integral part of socio-economic behavior, and it is tempting to argue 
that we have evolved specialized cognitive mechanisms to facilitate its stability, 
including systematic detection and punishment of cheaters6. 
 On religious accounts, Dawkins (1989: 193) wonders, “what is it about the 
idea of a god that gives it its stability and penetrance in the cultural 
environment? The survival value of the god meme in the meme pool results from 
its great psychological appeal. God exists, if only in the form of a meme with 
high survival value, or infective power, in the environment provided by human 
culture”. 
 Blakeslee & Ramachandran (1998), following Freud’s proposal of a 
defense mechanism, proposed an alternate theory about the evolution of self-
                                                 
6
 Huber, L. et al, “Cooperation in Keas: Social and Cognitive Factors”, in Itakura, S., Fujita, K. 
(eds.) Origins of the Social Mind: Evolutionary and Developmental Views, p. 105. 
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deception, suggesting that the real reason for the evolution of such mechanism 
(confabulation or Freudian defense mechanism) is to create a coherent belief 
system for the self. This allows the individual to act in such a manner that 
stability is imposed on his or her general schema (Sean et al., 2007). This view 
takes a priori that each of us need consistency, coherence, and continuity in our 
behavior and that in response to instances that do not fit our script, we tend to 
engage in self-deception behavior in order to preserve the autobiographical script 
and make the conflicting information “fit”. (Blakeslee & Ramachandran, 1998) 
The human brain might thus be equipped with a mechanism that “imposes 
stability on one’s script”. As Blakeslee & Ramachandran (1998) and Schacter 
(2001) have pointed out, there are numerous instances in everyday life in which 
people use consistency biases to impose a sense of stability or logic on the 
perceived world in a self-deceptive manner. Blakeslee & Ramachandran (1998)7 
proposed that the left-hemisphere is primarily responsible for imposing 
consistency on one’s script, while the right hemisphere is the “anomaly 
detector”. This view is based on studies of anosognosic patients with damage on 
the right hemisphere. These patients will vehemently deny the paralysis of their 
felt arm.  
 Psychologically, conceptions of how to balance the relative stability of 
living systems against the diversity and change that characterizes evolution 
introduced notions of order and entropy in place of variation, selections and 
transmission. Equilibrium theory, contrary to Darwin’s insistent gradualism, is 
characterized by long durations of stability of form interspersed by geologically 
brief periods of change. This aspect of punctuated equilibrium theory is now 
considered a real possibility. 
 Since Smith and Simpson (2004) claim that, there is no such thing as zero 
risk, no physical item that has zero failure risk and no human being that makes 
zero errors, it seems important to look into how an organism could cope with 
change, uncertainty, novelty and sometimes risk.  
 Gomot et al. (2006) hypothesize that the resistance to change in children 
with autism could be rooted in atypical processing of unexpected stimuli. In their 
fMRI analysis children with autism, during both deviance and “novelty 
detection” showed reduced activation of the left anterior cingulate cortex. This 
conforms evidence from ERP studies of atypical brain function related to 
automatic change detection in autism.  
 It appears that the organism, together with its components, is able to 
respond effectively to the salient environment if there is a degree of stability, 
                                                 
7
 Blakeslee & Ramachandran (1998), pp. 534-535. 
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which would allow its best possible functionality. Stability, thus, needed for a 
proper functioning, imposed even when it is not present (see Ramachandran’s 
left hemisphere’s “general” and Gazzaniga’s left hemisphere’s “interpreter”) 
seems to play an important role in human life. Once the regularities in the 
environment and the sensorimotor representations seem to change, the organism 
has to find a way to cope with the uncertain stimulus.  
 What happens when this stability begins to wave? As a possible answer to 
this question, we postulate that there must be a mechanism able to detect its 
absence and decide how to deal with the change. We shall call this the Instability 
Detector Mechanism (IDM) and try to look into its structure, behavior and 
interconnectivity. In this mechanism, we hypothesize that the emotion of 
surprise plays the role of the devise that sets out the re-stabilizing process, trying 
to reestablish the vanished balance. We shall consider surprise the instability 
detector as in the case of the fire alarm activated by a smoke detector. The reason 
for this assumption is that surprise (Lat. sur + prendere = over + take, to 
overtake) is a sudden reaction to an unexpected or a novel/uncertain 
situation/stimulus that seems to lie at the boundary between cognitive and 
emotional processes. A state that unexpectedly and suddenly overtakes us, 
pointing out towards something unknown, a novel situation, or could confuse us 
as an unexpected, unusual, unbelievable, or astonishing situation. In either case, 
it is short-lived and triggers different states, both cognitive and affective.  
When the stability of the familiarity is shaken, when the personal world-
view and beliefs are contradicted, when something incongruous and 
unaccountable is met, surprise seems to lead the person to a point of view from 
which the event, that triggered the unexpected, would somehow again make 
sense.  
 In affective studies, three dimensions of emotion have been addressed: (1) 
arousal (calm, excited); (2) valence (unpleasant, neuter, pleasant); and (3) 
potency or dominance (small, large). Arousal, the reaction intensity on coming 
upon an emotional charged stimulus, is associated with non-conscious, 
autonomic responses of the central nervous system. The hedonic valence 
categorizes the stimulus and is seen as appraisal evidence of affective states and 
is mostly connected with cognitive processes. Bradley and Lang (1994) 
speculate that the dominance dimension, which is relatively weak in accounting 
for variance in evaluative judgments of symbolic stimuli, is perhaps more potent 
in social interactions. 
Pfaff (2006) considers that arousal processes, fundamental to all cognition 
and temperament, are at the base of emotional life. In his opinion, arousal 
precedes alertness, attention and orientation. At the very beginning of his book, 
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Pfaff asks the questions, “Why does and animal or a human being do something 
under one environmental condition and not another? Why does an animal or 
human being do anything at all?” He proposes that the answer to these questions 
could be found in the elementary arousal of the central nervous system (CNS), 
which he calls “the generalized arousal”. In the CNS, beneath all mental 
functions and particular emotional dispositions, “the generalized arousal” 
“throbs in the brainstem, activating or brains and behavior”.  
The emotion of surprise has been addressed by many researchers by 
various approaches. Some researchers considered it as one of the “basic 
emotions” (Ekman and Friesen, 1978; Izard, 1991; Plutchik, 1980), on the basis 
of its unique manifestations. Russell (1991) classified surprise as an emotional 
state high in activation and neutral in valence, i.e. neither pleasant nor 
unpleasant. Appraisal theorists, looking at emotions as states stimulated by the 
organism’s evaluation and interpretation of events, have associated surprise with 
appraisals of unexpectedness, pleasantness, novelty, motive consistency and 
complexity (Smith and Ellsworth, 1985; Roseman, 1984; Reisenzein, 1999). 
However, as far as our knowledge goes, none of these theorists has 
considered the emotions of surprise as itself being the initiator of other emotions 
and as the link between affective, cognitive and behavioral processes. A related 
idea (Mandler, 1990) was suggesting that surprise might precede emotions, as it 
could not be part of other valenced affective experiences. Ortony and Turner 
(1990), appraisal theorists, excluded surprise from the emotion’s list altogether, 
as, in their opinion, no affective state ought to lack valence. Kagan (2007: 98) 
says, “I noted that unexpected or unfamiliar events or feelings potentiate all 
emotional states”, but no more details are given in this respect. Kagan connects 
the increase of the heart rate with the feeling of unexpectedness.  
What makes surprise different from other affective processes? In our 
understanding, the emotion of surprise seems to have various distinct features: it 
 - seems to act as a borderline phenomena (reaction or judgment); 
 - swings between cognitive processes and affective states; 
 - ridges cognitive processes and affective states; 
 - is the first displayed in infants in the first 6 months immediately leading 
to a bipolar state: a negative or distress state and a positive or satiated state; 
 - by itself has no ANS response tough emotional elicitors have autonomic 
biological adaptive character for other specific “basic” emotions; 
 - instantly activates the amygdala and the hippocampus; 
 - is essential for learning since has been shown that novelty improves 
memory 
 - is the briefest and immediately changing into basic emotions 
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 - does not require leaning and memory unlike all other basic emotions 
 - its intentional object is not dependent on cognition, rather on non-
cognition 
 - always occurs with organism perceiving itself as being surprised (a meta-
perceptual status) 
In surprise, through appraisal, the organism is deciding whether the novel 
stimulus is unpleasant, pleasant or neutral. These lead to the “basic emotions” 
 
 
 
Figure 7. Proposed mechanism of affective processes mechanism that rise from the perception of 
change/unexpected/novel stimuli 
 
In our premises, the emotion of surprise connects the emotional arousal 
with the cognitive appraisal. Thus, we presume that physiological arousal (low 
or high intensity) is the basis of qualitative distinctions (valence) among various 
emotional experiences. In this respect the arousal, responsible for the initiation 
and the intensity of emotional experiences, would initiate appraisals, responsible 
for the qualitative (valence) distinction between different emotional states. 
(Bradley & Lang, 2007) 
While analyzing the brainstem arousal systems, we looked into the arousal 
systems of the brainstem, how they prolong or heighten waking response to 
particular stimuli or conditions. It was shown that the noradrenaline (NA) 
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neurotransmitter, responsible for arousal and focusing of attention, gives rise to 
diffuse innervation of the entire brain. The locus coeruleus (LC) neurons, 
utilizing the NA, first provide innervation to the subcortical relay stations in the 
thalamus, hypothalamus and the basal forebrain. These subcortical components 
have the capacity to influence the cortex directly while recruiting the subcortical 
relays of the brainstem arousal. The stimulation of the LC elicits cortical 
activation that would lead to the appraisal processes. On the other hand, acording 
to Panksepp (1998), there is an innate emotional SEEKING system ingrained 
within the mammalian brain. Positive expectancy and anticipatory states emerge 
through its interaction with higher brain mechanisms such as the frontal cortex 
and hippocampus that generate plans by mediating higher-order temporal and 
spatial information processing. If the outcome of this interaction is unexpected 
or unanticipated then a “cognitive or expectancy reset” mechanism involving the 
cognitive dissonance would yield the subjective emotion of surprise. 
We propose that when a stimulus/event interrupts the habitual perceptual 
experience, produced whenever the mental representation of the stimulus is 
changed, altering habituation into dishabituation/sensitization, it arouses the 
experience of surprise, producing thus affective behavior in human mind. The 
perception of a novel stimulus takes place when the subject is confronted with 
something out of ordinary, something that does not fit into his/her knowledge 
base. If the stimulus is not the same, as in the habitual situation, the subject 
allocates attentional resources to the environmental change and the stimulus 
environment is changed or updated.  
The subject’s attentional resources would try to answer the question, 
“What is this X to my Y?”, where X stands for the target (novel stimulus) while 
Y is replaced by the subject’s essential requirements, such as safety, purpose, 
progress, or pleasure, when they are threatened, fulfilled or lost, opposed and 
offended respectively. In each of these cases, a different affective state follows, 
as the case of the question, “What is this snake to my safety?” would lead to the 
experience of fear.  
Figure 8 illustrates different appraisals to the subject’s essential 
requirements aroused by the novel stimulus through the evaluation of the 
relevance it could bear to the subject. Different affective states are generated as 
response to the novel stimulus properties, which could be seen in terms of 
intensity and safety. The affective response is seen as bearing functional 
properties, at the psycho-physiological level as well as at the motor level, 
generating specific behaviour.  
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Figure 8.  Affective processes initiated by novel stimuli “breaking up”  
the organism’s habitual “slumber” 
 
The ventral (or “what”) visual stream picks up the relevant information of 
the novel stimulus. Blakeslee and Ramachandran (1998) briefly state that the 
“what” pathway, compared with the “how” pathway, the dorsal stream, is 
conscious and suggest that the difference is made by being linked to the 
amygdala and other limbic structures. The amygdala monitors the perceptual 
representations and “serves the organism’s basic goals”, determining “whether 
or not to respond emotionally to something and what responses are appropriate”. 
The insular cortex, driven by sensory input and viscera, provides the amygdala 
with supplementary information, a “gut reaction” to something. 
In our opinion, the “basic evolutionary goals” could be seen as safety, 
pleasure, purpose and desire. The meaning or significance of the change in a 
situation, presumed as connected with the perception of a novel stimulus/event, 
is “picked up” by the amygdala, which initiates emotional experiences according 
to the way it affects the organism. 
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 Conclusion  
 We proposed that the emotion of surprise connects neuropsychological and 
physiological arousal processes with the cognitive appraisal processes. Thus, we 
have shown that neuropsychological and physiological arousal is the basis of 
qualitative distinctions (valence) among various emotional experiences. In this 
respect, the arousal, responsible for the initiation and the intensity of emotional 
experiences, generates appraisals, responsible for the hedonic quantitative 
(valence) distinction between different emotional states. Looking at affective 
processes in this perspective seems to eliminate the dichotomy of mind and 
body. The emotion of surprise has been considered the initiator of other 
emotions and the link between affective, cognitive and behavioral processes.  
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